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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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T. BARLETIC; CITY OF McKEESPORT POL DEPT.; DAVID FATH
Hubert T. Hudson,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
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(Honorable Gary L. Lancaster)
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 1, 2007
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed August 10, 2007)
OPINION OF THE COURT
2PER CURIAM.
Hubert Hudson appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint
for the second time pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  We will vacate the order and
remand.
Previously we described Hudson’s complaint:
On November 22, 2005, Hudson filed a handwritten pro se complaint along
with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Although the complaint is
admittedly difficult to understand, we can discern some, but not all of, the
claims in the complaint. Hudson alleged that, on September 2, 2005, Dennis
Wyn of the McKeesport Police Department entered his home without a
warrant or probable cause and wrongfully arrested him using excessive
force.  According to Hudson, Wyn “grabed [sic] my neck, hand cuffed,
throwr [sic] the [sic] ground by way of, knight stick [sic], back of right
knee/legs” and “kicked in the face while the [sic] ground.” (Compl. at 4.) 
He also claimed that Magistrate Barletic uses his office to enrich himself
and the town by collaborating with racist police officers to force local
African-Americans to plead guilty to “bogus charges.” (Compl. at 5.) 
Finally Hudson claimed that there is a conspiracy between Magistrate
Barletic and the Mayor of McKeesport involving the local police and
housing authority to intimidate and harass the town's African-American
population. (Compl. at 6-7.)
Hudson v. McKeesport Police Chief, 182 F. App’x 124, 125-26 (3d Cir. 2006).
The District Court dismissed this complaint, finding that it did not conform to the
requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) and was “so confusing or unintelligible that no party
could possibly understand or reply to it.”  Hudson v. McKeesport, No. 05-01611 slip op.
at 3 (W.D.Pa. November 29, 2005).  We reversed, finding that “ [e]ven if the District
Court is correct and the ‘complaint is so confusing that no party could possibly
understand or reply to it,’ slip op. at 3, the proper remedy is not immediate dismissal.” 
     Based on his informal brief filed in this appeal, we believe that the judicial1
proceeding that he referred to in the amended complaint was probably an eviction
proceeding.  (App. Br. at 3.)
     We have jurisdiction to consider this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our2
review of a District Court’s dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) is plenary.  Allah v.
Severling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We may affirm the District Court on any
ground supported by the record.  Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir.
1999).  
3
Hudson, 182 Fed. App’x at 126.  We held that “prior to dismissing a pro se complaint
under § 1915(e), a district court must give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his
pleading to cure the defect unless such an amendment would be futile or prejudicial.”  Id. 
We also noted that, liberally construed, some of his claims satisfied the requirements of
Rule 8(a).  Id.  
On remand, the District Court issued an order that read in its entirety: “[a]nd now,
this 10th day of June, 2006, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs shall file an
amended complaint in the instant case on or before June 30, 2006.”  One week later
Hudson filed a one-page handwritten document titled “amended complaint.”  Hudson’s
“amended complaint” does not reference his previous complaint, or any of the events
described therein.  Instead it includes what appear to be discovery requests and
complaints about an unspecified ongoing judicial proceeding.   The District Court found1
that the amended complaint was incomprehensible and, under the same rationale as
before, dismissed the case.2
4We find that the District Court erred in dismissing Hudson’s case without
considering whether his original complaint satisfied FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)’s pleading
standards.
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint include “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief,” and Rule 8(f)
instructs district courts that “[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial
justice.”   A plaintiff’s complaint “must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claim is and the ground upon which it rests.”  Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002)(quotations omitted).  Allegations in a pro se complaint
“however inartfully pleaded are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.”  Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal quotations and
citations omitted); see also Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002).
Hudson’s complaint includes some claims that would give fair notice to the
defendants.  Hudson alleges that, on September 2, 2005, Officer Dennis Wyn violated his
Fourth Amendment rights by entering his home without a warrant or probable cause,
falsely arresting him, and using excessive force.  He also alleges that Mayor James
Brewster, the City of Mckeesport, the Police Chief, and the McKeesport Police
Department are liable because this sort of behavior is a custom in the Department and is
     “Mckeesport Police Dept. have beaten, maim[ed], mali[c]ously blacken[ed], eyes3
etc[.], with the consent, of, Brewster.  He allows warrantless, arrest, inva[s]ions [of]
private properties, homes, apts. without cause. ”  (Comp. at 6.)  
     Hudson claims that Magistrate Barletic is part of a conspiracy with the police to4
intimidate and harass African-Americans.  In this conspiracy, the police falsely arrest
residents of the Mckeesport Housing Authority who are brutalized, intimidated, and then
forced to plead guilty to “bogus charges.”  (Compl. at 5, 7.)  Hudson also claims that the
Magistrate violated his rights while presiding over the criminal proceedings that resulted
from his arrest by Officer Wyn.  (Compl. at 3,7.)
5
done with Mayor Brewster’s consent.   See Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County,3
Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997).
However, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Hudson’s complaint with
respect to its claims against Magistrate Barletic and David Fath – presumably of the
McKeesport Housing Authority.  Hudson’s claims against David Fath fail to meet the
minimal standard of Rule 8(a).  Hudson merely includes Fath in the caption of his
complaint and does not provide any basis for a claim against him.  Hudson’s claims
against Magistrate Barletic must be dismissed because they do not state any claim upon
which relief can be granted.   Section 1915(e)(2).  He does not plead any basis from4
which a conspiracy with the police to violate African-American residents’ constitutional
rights can be inferred.  See D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical
School, 972 F.2d 1364, 1377 (3d Cir. 1992).  His other claims against Magistrate Barletic
all relate to the Magistrate’s performance of his judicial duties and are, therefore, barred
by judicial immunity.  See  Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991). 
6Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order in part, affirm in part, and
remand for further proceedings.
